バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第6章:道徳的義務 n.28 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, chapter 6: Moral obligation, n.28 | |||
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We might, without infringing this rule, make distinctions among different classes of individuals. The commonest distinction, in ethical philosophy, would be between virtuous men and sinners. Many theologians have held that justice is a good per se, and that, on this account, the good will inherit eternal bliss while the wicked will suffer eternal torture. In this terrestrial life, it is our duty - so these theologians have held - to imitate the Divine decrees as far as we can, by conferring rewards upon the good and punishments upon the wicked - punishments of which the purpose is not wholly deterrent or reformatory, but in part purely retributive. This view is much less common now than in former times: most men, now-a-days, regard the criminal law as having the prevention of crime for its purpose, and the belief in hell has been abandoned or grown dim. But it remains a logically possible view that we ought to love some kinds of men and hate other kinds, in the absolute sense that the satisfaction of the desires of those whom we are to hate is to be reckoned an evil, and the thwarting of their desires is to be reckoned a good. What is there to be said against this view? |