バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』第2部[「情熱の葛藤」- 第2章- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, Part II, chapter 3
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第2部「情熱の葛藤」- 第3章「先見と技術」n.3 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, part II: The Conflict of Passions, chapter 3: Forethought and Skill, n.3 | |||
知性は、― 人類の歴史において具体的に示されているように ― 主に先見(forethought)と技能という二つの形で表されている。まずは先見から始めることにする。 |
It cannot be said that the control of impulse beyond a point is desirable. In extreme forms, such as an impulse to murder, it must be controlled either by the individual or by the law. But a life in which impulse is controlled beyond a point loses its savour and becomes joyless and anaemic. Impulse must be allowed a large place in human life, but ought not to lead, as in fact it does, to vast systems of individual and collective self-deception. Intelligence has been used, broadly speaking, to control impulse in the interests of conscious desire. The distinction may be illustrated by very simple kinds of behaviour. When an animal is hungry and food is before it, it eats on impulse, and there is not that gulf between the present and the future which is characteristic of conscious desire. The animal then does nothing further in the way of looking for food until appetite revives. A human being, on the other hand, when he has had an adequate meal, realizes that he will presently be hungry again and takes steps to secure future meals. In doing this, he is acting upon desire rather than upon impulse. I do not pretend that desire as opposed to impulse is absent in the life of animals; still less, that impulse as opposed to desire is absent in the life of human beings. What I am saying is that, owing to intelligence, desire as opposed to impulse controls a much larger part of the actions of men than of those of animals. Intelligence, as exemplified in human history, has two main forms: forethought and skill. I shall begin with forethought. |