バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』10-09- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第10章:倫理学における権威 n.9 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, chapter 10: Authority in Ethics, n.9 | |||
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We may say, therefore, as a first step towards the answer to our question, that, if A and B belong to the same herd, when A says to B, “you ought to have done X”, he means, “the act X would have furthered the interests of the herd to which we both belong”. This insures that any two persons who in the relevant respects belong to B’s herd will give the same answer to the question if they make no mistake of fact, but it does not insure that people outside that herd will give the same answer. We are thus led to the question of partial and general goods which was discussed in an earlier chapter, and are led, by the arguments given in that chapter, to the conclusion that the only way to secure objectivity in the meaning of “ought” is to enlarge our herd until it embraces all human beings, or, better perhaps, everything sentient. In this way, and in this way only, can we insure that what A says B ought to do does not depend upon who A is. It is such considerations that lead me to adopt the following definition: |