バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第6章:道徳的義務 n.32 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, chapter 6: Moral obligation, n.32 | |||
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It follows that ethical argument, when it is not merely as to the best means to a given end, differs from scientific argument in being addressed to the emotions, however it may disguise itself by use of the indicative mood. It must not be supposed that, on this account, ethical argument is impossible; it is as easy, if not easier, to influence emotions by argument as to influence intellectual convictions. The difficulty that will be felt is that, in intellectual argument, there is supposed to be a standard of impersonal truth to which we are appealing, while in ethics, on the above view, there appears to be no such standard. This difficulty is real and profound. I shall consider its scope in a later chapter. |