バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第6章:道徳的義務 n.22 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, chapter 6: Moral obligation, n.22 | |||
従って、何が客観的に正しいかについては、2つの見解が残される。 (即ち)私達は「各人が自分の善を追求することは客観的に正しい」と言ってよいかもしれない。 あるいは 「一般的な善を追求することは客観的に正しい」と言ってよいかもしれない。ここでは、私達は、「客観的に正しい」を未だに定義不可能なものとして扱い、定義によってではなく、議論や倫理的直感によってこれら2つの命題のどちらかを決定する可能性を前提としている。 |
There are, as we have seen, two ways in which moral rules can be made general. One is to define the general good, and to say that all men ought to pursue it. The other is to define the private good of an individual or group, and to say that each individual ought to pursue his own good or that of his group. The view that each individual ought to pursue the good of his group (as opposed to his own good) is that which must be held by those who make patriotism or family loyalty the supreme duty. To this view, as we have seen, there are objections derived from the fact that there is no discoverable reason for preferring one of the groups to which a man belongs to another: family, nation, class, creed, all have claims, and there is no argument proving that ethical predominance should be given to any one of them. We are thus left with two views as to what is objectively right. We may say: “It is objectively right for each man to pursue his own good”; or we may say: “It is objectively right to pursue the general good”. Here we are still treating “objectively right” as something indefinable, and are assuming the possibility of deciding between the above two propositions, not by a definition, but by argument or ethical intuition. |