Are there circumstances which justify the authorities in putting to death a man who has committed no crime? The traditional view is that there are not, but this view has been increasingly challenged, and is hard to defend as an absolute principle.
One exception, so rare as to have little importance, has been half-heartedly admitted. Sufferers from hydrophobia have been given such large doses of morphia as rendered them harmless and before long caused their death. In this case, a justification might be found in the fact that such patients are dangerous, but I do not think any such justification is needed. When an illness is incurable and painful, and makes useful activity impossible, it is mere cruelty to prolong life; at any rate if the sufferer is anxious to die, or has lost his reason. The prolongation of his life can be neither a happiness to himself por a benefit to society, and is therefore equally unjustified from the standpoint of the individual and from that of the community.
It may, of course, be objected that many diseases formerly thought incurable can now be successfully treated, and that the treatment would probably never have been discovered if patients had been subjected to euthanasia. In general, however, there is a long stage of experimentation before a new cure is tried on human beings, and until this stage has been completed there is no reason to keep patients alive as material for experi ment. If any reputable medical practitioner believes that he possesses a cure, he should be allowed to try it before eutha nasia is resorted to; but where no suggested cure has reached even the experimental stage, the prolongation of suffering cannot be rationally justified.
I am inclined, though with less confidence, to extend the same arguments to congenital idiocy. A congenital idiot cannot be useful to society, and is not likely to enjoy much happiness. But one cannot say the same of the feeble-minded: most of them can be taught to do useful work of a simple kind, and in proper conditions they need not be unhappy. Moreover, it is not always quite certain to what extent a person is mentally deficient; the matter is one of degree, and therefore doubtful borderline cases are unavoidable.
Criminals condemned to long terms ought to have the option of euthanasia. It may be that few would choose it, bu there must be some to whom the prospect of long years in prison, followed by an old age of poverty and dishonour, is worse than death.
Are there circumstances which justify the infliction of death where there has been no crime? Conventionally, the answer is no, except as regards enemies in war. I think, in practice, it is right to hold that a man should not be put to death against his will unless the reasons for doing so are overwhelmingly strong. One could imagine circumstances say, where a man develops pneumonic plague - where to avoid the spread of the disease, it might be justifiable to put him to death. But in view of human fallibility, any attempt to apply such a principle should be very closely scrutinised. There is in human nature a fund of cruelty, which in fortunate circum stances may remain latent, but which, if it finds even a legitimate outlet, may increase and find employment in seeking justifications of barbarities. This limits the degree to which, in practice, it is wise to allow the infliction of grave injury upon individuals for the sake of the public good.
